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COMMENTS
CRIMINALIZING HIV TRANSMISSION:
LESSONS FROM HISTORY AND A
MODEL FOR THE FUTURE
The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)' epidemic is now
more than a decade old in the United States.2 More than 200,000 cases of
AIDS have been reported to public health organizations, and over 100,000
people have died from AIDS-related illnesses. The ultimate dimension of
the public health catastrophe that this disease will inflict upon Americans is
difficult to project because of the inherent difficulty of its detection4 and the
1. AIDS is an immunodeficiency syndrome manifested by the onset of one or more of
seven rare opportunistic diseases that result from infection with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV). Centers for Disease Control, Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition
for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 3 (1
Supp. 1987). For a list of the opportunistic diseases, see infra note 22.
2. The first manifestations of what physicians later diagnosed as AIDS occurred in 1981
when four homosexual males in Los Angeles developed unusual cases of pneumatic pneumo-
nia. Michael S. Gottlieb et al., Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia and Mucosal Candidiasis in
Previously Healthy Homosexual Men: Evidence of a New Acquired Cellular Immunodeficiency,
305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1425, 1425-31 (1981).
3. Centers for Disease Control, Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS-United
States, 40 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 41, 41 (1991). The Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) estimates that AIDS is the second leading cause of death among men between
the ages of 25 and 44 years. Id. at 41. Moreover, it is the leading cause of death among young
adult males in San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles. Id. at 43. The pattern of HIV
infection has shifted over the course of the last decade; while most deaths in the early years of
the AIDS epidemic occurred among Whites, the death rate is highest among Blacks and His-
panics. Id. at 41. AIDS has also become a leading cause of death among minority children.
In New York State in 1988, AIDS was the leading cause of death among Hispanic children
aged 1 to 4 years and the second leading cause of death among Black children within the same
age group. Id. at 44.
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON
ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 13 (1986). The report estimates that over 1.5
million people who show no symptoms of AIDS-related diseases may be infected with HIV
and capable of infecting others. It is presently estimated that 20 to 30% of those persons will
develop AIDS. Id. Cf Ruth L. Berkelman et al., Epidemiology of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 86 AM. J. MED. 761, 761 (1989).
The latency period between HIV infection and development of AIDS is variable; however,
researchers predict that 78 to 100% of persons infected with HIV will develop AIDS within 15
years. Id. The CDC estimates that one million persons are currently infected with HIV and
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modest expectations of developing a curative treatment.5 Although the rate
of increase in reported cases of AIDS has declined,6 the disease remains the
principal health priority of the United States.7 The grave medical and social
consequences of AIDS continue to prompt many forms of response. Never-
theless, no consensus exists as to the most effective means to control the
spread of this fatal disease.
The public health response to the AIDS crisis in the United States has
been implemented largely through a combination of federal and state legisla-
tion establishing a range of noncoercive AIDS related programs.' State leg-
islatures have also enacted coercive measures aimed at controlling the HIV
infection rate, despite public health experts' disavowal of the effectiveness of
these compulsory measures. 9 A recent trend in state AIDS legislation in-
volves the formulation of means to prosecute individuals for intentional
predicts that 165,000 to 215,000 will die from AIDS by the end of 1993. Centers for Disease
Control, supra note 3, at 42.
5. Current treatments for AIDS are not curative; they merely delay the onset of opportu-
nistic diseases. See infra note 26.
6. Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United
States, 1981-1988, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 229, 230 (1989). A single ex-
ception to this trend existed in 1987, when the rate of reported AIDS cases increased; however,
this increase followed an expansion of the list of diseases constituting AIDS. See Centers for
Disease Control, supra note 1, at 3S-15S. Several explanations have been offered for the
change in the HIV infection rate: 1) changes in behavior or "saturation" of infection among
the highest risk categories-homosexual and bisexual men; 2) less complete or more delayed
AIDS case reporting; and 3) new therapies that slow the development of AIDS leading to
fewer diagnoses and reports. Centers for Disease Control, The Future Course of AIDS in the
United States, 263 JAMA 1539, 1539 (1990).
7. AIDS INFORMATION SOURCEBOOK 3 (H. Robert Malinowsky & Gerald J. Perry eds.,
2d ed. 1990). In May 1983, Edward N. Brandt, Assistant Secretary of Health and Human
Services, announced that AIDS had become the number one priority of the U.S. Public Health
Service. Id.
8. Noncoercive measures focusing on education and counselling have been a major focus
of the government's public health response. These programs rely upon voluntary participation
by the targeted group of the population, e.g., voluntary HIV testing or distribution of AIDS
information to pregnant women and female teenagers. Coercive programs compel participa-
tion in testing or counselling programs based upon one's status as HIV positive, or as a pris-
oner, for instance. For a summary of recent coercive and noncoercive AIDS public health
legislation enacted by state governments see infra notes 92-94 and see generally, Lawrence 0.
Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, 261 JAMA 1621 (1989).
9. See Gostin, supra note 8, at 1629 ("[L]egislation for compulsory screening, isolation,
and criminalization has proceeded despite the absence of evidence that it is efficacious and the
fact that it often contradicts explicit public health advice."); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin et al.,
The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS: Testing, Screening, and Re-
porting, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 (1987) (faulting legislatures for failing to plan how to use the
collected information and for not considering the detrimental effect such programs will have
on participation in public health programs for education, counselling, and treatment); see also
U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT supra note 4, at 33-
34 (rejecting compulsory blood testing and quarantine as effective responses to AIDS crisis).
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transmission of HIV. An implicit catalyst to this state legislative activity is
the recent passage of The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources
Emergency (CARE) Act of 1990.10 The Act makes state emergency AIDS
relief grants contingent upon a state's showing statutory capability to prose-
cute individuals infected with HIV who intentionally or knowingly infect or
expose others through sexual contact, blood or tissue donation, or through
the sharing of a hypodermic needle.I" Several alternative means to satisfy
the federal requirement are available to the states. In addition to enacting
statutes that criminalize the intentional exposure of others to the AIDS vi-
rus, states may also satisfy the federal requirement through several statutory
alternatives.
One of the alternatives is to include HIV in existing public health statutes
that were enacted over a century ago to control the spread of syphilis, 2 an
earlier epidemic sharing several important characteristics with AIDS. The
10. The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (amending the
Public Health Service Act of 1970). The purpose of the Act is:
to provide emergency assistance to localities that are disproportionately affected by
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus epidemic and to make financial assistance avail-
able to States and other public or private nonprofit entities to provide for the devel-
opment, organization, coordination and operation for more effective and cost efficient
systems for the delivery of essential services to individuals and families with HIV
disease.
Id. § 2 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300f). For a comprehensive analysis of the features of the
CARE legislation see Raymond C. O'Brien, A Legislative Initiative: The Ryan White Compre-
hensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 183
(1991).
11. Section 2647 of the Act states:
(a) IN GENERAL-The Secretary [of the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices] may not make a grant under section 2641 to a State unless the chief executive
officer determines that the criminal laws of the State are adequate to prosecute any
HIV infected individual, subject to the condition described in subsection (b), who-
(1) makes a donation of blood, semen, or breast milk, if the individual knows that
he or she is infected with HIV and intends, through such donation, to expose
another HIV [sic] in the event that the donation is utilized;
(2) engages in sexual activity if the individual knows that he or she is infected with
HIV and intends, through such sexual activity, to expose another to HIV; or
(3) injects himself or herself with a hypodermic needle and subsequently provides
the needle to another person for purposes of hypodermic injection, if the individual
knows that he or she is infected and intends, through the provision of the needle,
to expose another to such etiologic agent in the event that the needle is utilized.
(b) CONSENT TO THE RISK OF TRANSMISSION-The State laws described in subsec-
tion (a) need not apply to circumstances under which the conduct described in
paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) if the individual who is subjected to the
behavior involved knows that the other individual is infected and provides prior in-
formed consent to the activity.
CARE § 2647 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47).
12. See infra note 60.
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similarity of the modes of transmission of syphilis and AIDS, along with the
common sociological and public health consequences of infection, makes a
comparison of the public health response to syphilis and AIDS useful in
assessing the effectiveness of imposing criminal liability on acts that risk
HIV transmission.
The similarity between syphilis and AIDS, including a comparison of the
etiologies, pathologies, modes of transmission, and social implications of
these epidemics is discussed in Part I of this Comment. Parts II and III
examine the historical parallels of the coercive and noncoercive public health
response to syphilis and AIDS, preceeded by an analysis of case law empow-
ering states to invoke laws to protect public health. Part IV sets out three
statutory schemes used by the states to criminalize transmission of HIV.
The requisite elements and evidentiary requirements of each statutory alter-
native are critically analyzed in order to measure their prospective
effectiveness.
In conclusion, this Comment recognizes that many of the effective nonco-
ercive elements of the public health campaign to control the spread of
syphilis have been duplicated in response to the AIDS epidemic. However,
continued success of these public health programs is jeopardized by the
states' use of traditional criminal law and public health statutes to prosecute
individuals for activity risking HIV transmission. An AIDS-specific statute
imposing criminal liability for a limited number of high-risk activities, and
incorporating the defense of consent, will effectively serve the criminal law
objectives of punishment and deterrence at a lower cost to enforcement re-
sources and personal privacy. Nevertheless, even a narrowly drawn statute
that criminalizes only the most culpable HIV risking behavior-intentional
and knowing commission of acts risking HIV transmission-may exacerbate
the public health crisis from AIDS. Elements of intent in these statutes,
which require a defendant to know he is infected with HIV, create a disin-
centive for persons engaging in activities posing a high risk of HIV transmis-
sion to determine whether they have been infected with the virus. To the
extent criminal statutes are used at all in the public health effort to control
the spread of AIDS, they should be used 1) as a means of informing the
public of the proscribed acts medically proven as capable of transmitting
HIV, 2) to assuage public fears of casual contagion, and 3) to encourage
persons to determine their HIV status and participate in counselling and
treatment programs.
I. DIVERSE ORIGINS OF A COMMON RESULT
An analysis of the efforts to comprehend and control syphilis in the late
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gies.2 AIDS, conversely, is caused by a human retrovirus, Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),2 which attacks the immune system, leaving
victims susceptible to a host of fatal opportunistic diseases.22
Transmission of the causative agent of both syphilis and HIV occurs pri-
marily through sexual contact;23 although several additional activities have
been documented as modes of transmission of HIV.24 The availability of a
curative treatment for syphilis represents a major difference between the two
diseases, but also highlights the fallacious use of public health measures as a
short term remedy prior to the discovery of a curative treatment. Early ther-
apies for treating syphilis were expensive, painful, and often produced seri-
20. Brandt, supra note 14, at 375. The major pathologies resulting from syphilis infection
include degenerative heart, brain, and optical disease, and, if the infection reaches the spinal
cord, paralysis. DOWLING, supra note 19, at 84.
21. Berkelman et al., supra note 4, at 761.
22. The CDC documents the number of HIV infected persons who contract any one of
several opportunistic diseases: pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, disseminated cytomegalovirus,
disseminated mycobacterium avium-intracellulare, candida esophagitis, mucocutaneous herpes
simplex, crytococcus neoformans menangitis, cerebral Toxoplasma gondii, and enteric
cryptosporidiosis. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 1, at IS. The CDC recently
proposed to expand the definition of AIDS beyond the seven opportunistic diseases. Wider
Definition May Swell AIDS Total, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1991, at Al6. The proposed defini-
tion would include persons infected with, HIV and whose blood showed a laboratory count of
less than 200 CD4 lymphocyte cells per cubic millimeter. Id. The lymphocyte cells are the
primary target of HIV and a reduced count is a precursor of AIDS-related illness. Id. Under
the amended definition, the number of AIDS cases in the United States could nearly double.
Id.
23. DOWLING, supra note 19, at 82; Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission
of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1126 (1987).
24. In addition to sexual contact, other documented modes of HIV transmission include
transfer of blood or blood products, intravenous drug use, and perinatal events-infection dur-
ing pregnancy or childbirth. Friedland & Klein, supra note 23, at 1125. The fear among the
public that HIV may be transmitted through casual contact-kissing, sharing household uten-
sils, etc.-remains unsubstantiated by medical evidence. See James W. Curran, The Epidemi-
ology of AIDS: Current Status and Future Prospects, 229 Sci. 1352, 1356 (1985) (reporting
household members frequently touching and sharing common household items with AIDS
victims have shown no meaningful increase in risk of HIV infection from this contact); Gerald
H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Lack of Transmission of HTL V-Ill/LA V Infection to House-
hold Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314
NEW ENG. J. MED. 344, 348 (1986) (finding household members who are not sex partners of,
nor born to, person with AIDS are at minimal risk of infection); see also Margaret A. Fischl et
al., Evaluation of Heterosexual Partners, Children, and Household Contacts of Adults with
AIDS, 257 JAMA 640, 644 (1987) (finding no HIV infection resulting from casual household
contact with adults with AIDS).
Incidence of HIV infection through blood transfusion fell sharply after March 1985 follow-
ing the introduction of the ELISA blood test. The test enables blood banks to detect and
exclude infected blood from the blood supply. June E. Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery
of a New Disease, in AIDS AND THE LAW 17, 25 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987).
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nineteenth century serves as a useful analog for assessing the public health
response to the AIDS epidemic in the late twentieth century.13 Syphilis and
AIDS possess several commonalities: both have existed in epidemic propor-
tions;' 4 each may be sexually transmitted 5 and manifest after a long latency
period; 6 the two have severe pathological consequences; 17 and both have
created fear and hysteria among the general public.' 8
Syphilis and AIDS possess distinct etiological origins. Syphilis is caused
by a microorganism' 9 transferred through the bloodstream to internal or-
gans with the potential of causing a variety of serious or even fatal patholo-
13. Several other epidemics are not suitable for comparison to AIDS for the purposes of
ascertaining an appropriate public health response to control infection rates.. Tuberculosis, for
example, was a major epidemic in the early years of the twentieth century. At its peak, the
tuberculosis epidemic caused the death of over 400 Americans each day. LEIGH M. HODGES,
THE PEOPLE AGAINST TUBERCULOSIS 7 (1942). This extremely contagious disease is trans-
mitted through the inhalation of tubercle bacilli ejected from an infected individual while
coughing, sneezing, or speaking. Neither the transmitter nor the contractor can voluntarily
control the spread of the disease. Prior to the development of an effective cure, restrictions on
personal autonomy may arguably have been the only appropriate response to control the
spread of the disease. Kathryn Render, Comment, Tuberculosis Chapters: A Model for Future
AIDS Legislation?, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1145, 1146 (1988) (examining tuberculosis legislation
as a guide to the legislative response to AIDS). Neither syphilis nor HIV, however, have been
documented to be transmittable by casual contact. See infra notes 24, 37. Therefore other less
restrictive public health responses to control infection are appropriate.
For an examination of governmental response to AIDS in the context of the Black Death of
the fourteenth century and leprosy, see Steven J. Stone, Comment, Protecting the Public From
AIDS: A New Challenge to Traditional Forms of Epidemic Control, 2 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 191 (1986).
14. Reporting of cases of syphilis infection was not organized on a national scale during
its epidemic years; however, Brandt indicates that studies suggest that 10% of the population
was infected and that syphilis was "a health problem of enormous dimensions." Allan M.
Brandt, The Syphilis Epidemic and its Relation to AIDS, 239 Sci. 375, 376 (1988).
In addition to the statistics cited in the Surgeon General's report, see U.S. DEP'T HEALTH
HUM. SERVS., supra note 4, other studies suggest that AIDS accounted for 9% of the total
mortality of men in the United States aged 25 to 34 in 1987 and was the seventh highest cause
of premature mortality of all persons in the United States in 1987. Berkelman et al., supra note
4, at 762.
15. Brandt, supra note 14, at 375.
16. John C. Cutler & R.C. Arnold, Venereal Disease Control by Health Departments in the
Past: Lessons for the Present, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 372, 372 (1988); see also, Berkelman et
al., supra note 4, at 761 (finding that the mean latency period between infection with HIV and
diagnosis of AIDS as a result of the appearance of an opportunistic disease is estimated to be
7.8 years).
17. Brandt, supra note 14, at 375.
18. The fear and hysteria produced by syphilis in its early epidemic years, and currently
by AIDS, originate from the inability of the medical research community to provide an effec-
tive treatment for an extremely contagious disease. Allan M. Brandt, AIDS: From Social His-
tory to Social Policy, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 236 (1986).
19. The name of the organism is Treponema pallidum. HARRY F. DOWLING, FIGHTING
INFECTION: CONQUESTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 84 (1977).
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ous side effects. 25  Available treatments for AIDS, none of which are
curative, also produce serious side effects in some patients.2 6 The discovery
of penicillin's effectiveness in treating syphilis led to a precipitous decline in
the rate of syphilis infection.2 7 Despite the current widespread availability
of antibiotics, the rate of syphilis infection has increased substantially in re-
cent years.28 This phenomenon may reflect changes in public attitudes to-
wards sex as well as changes in the political and economic commitment to
public health programs.29  This statistic supports the thesis that social
forces-not a curative treatment-may ultimately be the controlling factor
in the public health effort to control HIV infection.
For seventy years, this nation has struggled to control the spread of
syphilis. Its recent resurgence, coupled with the AIDS epidemic, provides
an even greater impetus for public health officials to examine the deep social
and moral forces affecting sexual conduct.3" Compulsory measures limiting
individual liberty, while placing hope in the discovery of a medical cure as a
panacea, failed as a public health response to syphilis.3" Therefore, similar
restrictions on individual liberty or reliance on a future curative treatment
for AIDS will not necessarily eliminate the disease from the population. Ef-
fective noncoercive public health measures are necessary to achieve long
25. Physicians treated syphilis-related diseases principally with mercury. DOWLING,
supra note 19, at 92. The metal's toxicity often resulted in "loss of teeth, tongue fissures, and
hemorrhaging of the bowel." Brandt, supra note 14, at 376. Later, the drug Salvarsan became
the treatment of choice but was also toxic and required numerous injections over a two year
period; only an estimated 25% of treated patients followed the therapy to completion. Id.
26. The principal treatments used to prevent or delay the onset of opportunistic disease
once a person is infected with HIV are azidothymidine (AZT) and aerosol pentamidine. Don-
ald Armstrong & Edward Bernard, Aerosol Pentamidine, 109 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 851,
852-53 (1988). AZT's toxicity limits the use of this therapy in both children and adults, and
one year's treatment costs approximately $8000. Michael Specter, AZTFound to Delay Onset
of AIDS; Treatment Urged for up to 650,000, WASH. POST, August 18, 1989, at 1. In October,
1991, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved a third anti-AIDS drug, dideoxyi-
nosine (DDI). Laurie Garrett, FDA Speeds AIDS-Drug Approval, NEWSDAY, October 15,
1991, at 61.
27. Incidence of syphilis fell from 72 cases per 100,000 persons in 1943, the year of peni-
cillin's introduction as a treatment for syphilis, to about 4 per 100,000 by 1956. Brandt, supra
note 14, at 379.
28. "Between 1981 and 1989, incidence of primary and secondary syphilis increased from
13.7 to 18.4 cases per 100,000 persons in the United States." Robert T. Rolfs & Allyn K.
Nakashima, Epidemiology of Primary and Secondary Syphilis in the United States, 1981
Through 1989, 264 JAMA 1432, 1432 (1990).
29. Brandt, supra note 14, at 379; Cutler & Arnold, supra note 16, at 375.
30. See Marshall H. Becker & Jill G. Joseph, AIDS and Behavioral Change to Reduce
Risk- A Review, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 394, 407 (1988) (finding that changes in human
behavior occurred as a result of the threat of HIV infection).
31. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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term control of HIV infection.32
II. SYPHILIS AND THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE
In the sixteenth century, syphilis began to spread in alarming rates
throughout Europe. 33 The disease became a major public health concern in
the early nineteenth century during a period of devastating infection rates
that coincided with a breakthrough in the identification of the causative or-
ganism and efficacious treatments. 34 Ignorance, if not purposeful nonrecog-
nition of the modes of transmission of syphilis, hampered early efforts to
control the disease.3  An early explanation for the rise in infection rates of
syphilis during the nineteenth century identified the source of infection as
the thousands of immigrants entering America.36 Some physicians asserted
that syphilis could be spread through casual contact. 37
This so-called "discovery" unleashed an array of fears about disease and
sexuality in society, resulting in widespread panic 38 and stigmatization of the
infected, 39 despite medical evidence refuting such a theory." One noted
commentator on the social aspects of syphilis infection suggests that disclo-
sure of the true cause of contagion, promiscuity across several classes of soci-
ety, was suppressed as denial of the fact that syphilis represented a metaphor
32. See Cutler & Arnold, supra note 16, at 375 (stating that "only the involvement of all
levels of government, the community at large, and the medical, educational, industrial, and
social work sectors" will succeed in controlling the spread of AIDS); THE NAT'L COMM'N ON
ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, AMERICA LIVING WITH AIDS 19 (1991)
("Until a cure or vaccine is found, education and prevention are the only hope for altering the
course of the HIV epidemic.").
33. DOWLING, supra note 19, at 84. The actual origin of the disease remains unknown;
one theory hypothesizes that the disease was present at the dawn of civilization, while another
suggests that the disease was imported to Europe from the New World by Columbus's crew
returning from the first voyage in 1493. Id.
34. Brandt, supra note 14, at 375-76.
35. DOWLING, supra note 19, at 95 ("The prevalent attitude toward syphilis in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries was one of hopelessness and in the next two centuries was one
of indifference. Toward the end of the nineteenth century syphilis came to be looked on as a
disgrace.").
36. Brandt, supra note 14, at 376. Medical examinations at the ports contradicted such a
theory and the source was then identified as immigrant prostitutes working in the major cities.
Id.
37. Doctors later attributed infection with syphilis-without substantiation-to contact
with toilet seats, drinking cups, door knobs, pens, and pencils. Id.
38. According to Brandt, manifestations of the panic surrounding syphilis contagion may
have reflected denial. For example, during World War I, the U.S. Navy removed doorknobs
from its battleships to prevent the spread of infection, despite the large number of cases of
sexually transmitted syphilis among sailors. Brandt, supra note 18, at 232.
39. ALLAN M. BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET 184 (1987).
40. Brandt, supra note 18, at 232.
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of society's changing values about sexuality.4" The primary means to con-
trol the spread of syphilis-and other communicable diseases in the early
nineteenth century-was the enactment of public health laws under the po-
lice power of the state.42
A. Constitutional Basis for Public Health Laws
The authority of the states to exercise their police power43 to protect pub-
lic health is derived from the Constitution.' Within such power is the au-
thority of the state legislature to enact laws that protect public health and
safety.4 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court first enunciated
the standard for evaluating a state's exercise of its police power." Virtually
all state action in the public health arena has been upheld as a result of the
broad deference to states' enactment of public health laws required by Jacob-
son."7 When conflicts arise between politicians and public health officials
41. Id. at 232-33. According to Brandt, "[t]he problem of syphilis was seen as one dimen-
sion of a larger breakdown in values that emphasized the sanctity of the home, the domestic
role of women, and the principle of strict marital sexuality." Brandt, supra note 14, at 376.
42. See generally DOWLING, supra note 19.
43. The "police power" has never been defined in plain terms. Stone v. Mississippi, 101
U.S. 814, 818 (1880) ("Many attempts have been made in this Court and elsewhere to define
the police power, but never with entire success."). Black's Law Dictionary defines the police
power as:
An authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the Tenth Amend-
ment, U.S. Constitution, upon the individual states, and, in turn, delegated to local
governments, through which they are enabled to establish a special department of
police; adopt such laws and regulations as tend to prevent the commission of fraud
and crime, and secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of
its citizens by preserving the public order, preventing a conflict of rights in the com-
mon intercourse of the citizens, and insuring to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of
all the privileges conferred upon him or her by the general laws.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
44. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X, § 10.
45. In Gibbons v. Ogden, the United States Supreme Court first recognized the applica-
tion of the police power to protect public health. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 4 (1824).
46. 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). The Court held that states maintain the power to enact
mandatory vaccination laws within the scope of their police power that "embrace, at least,
such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the
public health and the public safety." Id. Laws that are "exercised in particular circumstances
and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go
so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public ... [will] authorize or
compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons." Id. at 28.
47. This power has been construed to permit state legislatures to not only take reasonable
action when an epidemic actually exists, but also to define what constitutes a contagious dis-
ease and take preventive actions. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27; In re Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663
(Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (stating that the legislature is vested with broad discretion in determining
1992]
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regarding the best course of action for controlling the spread of disease, they
are settled by the legislatures.4" The result in Jacobson allows state legisla-
tures to enact coercive public health laws under their police power without
substantiating the measures from a medical efficacy standpoint.4 9
States first began to exercise their police power in the late nineteenth cen-
tury in an effort to combat the spread of a series of contagious diseases.50
Quarantine,51 mandatory physical examinations, and vaccination were the
primary means employed to combat contagious diseases52 and were upheld
as constitutional applications of the police power.53
The impetus for the first major public health response to syphilis resulted
from large numbers of infections among military draftees and troops inca-
what are contagious and infectious diseases and in adopting means for preventing the spread
thereof); Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387, 390 (S.C. 1909) (holding that isolation orders invali-
dated only upon prima facie showing that the manner of isolation was so clearly beyond what
was necessary as to be arbitrary).
48. In Jacobson, the Court illustrated the tension between medical and lay opinion regard-
ing the appropriate responses to control infection:
The fact that the belief is not universal is not controlling, for there is scarcely any
kind of belief that is accepted by everyone. The possibility that the belief may be
wrong, and that science may yet show it to be wrong, is not conclusive; for the legis-
lature has the right to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people,
are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.
197 U.S. at 34-35 (quoting Viemeister v. White, 170 N.Y. 235 (1904)).
49. Scott Buns, Comment, Fear Itself- AIDS, Herpes and Public Health Decisions, 3 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 479, 482-83 (1985); Alexander G. Gray Jr., The Parameters of Mandatory
Public Health Measures and the AIDS Epidemic, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 505, 510-11 (1986).
50. These laws, most of which remain in force, were enacted to control outbreaks of tu-
berculosis, smallpox, scarlet fever, leprosy, cholera, bubonic plague and venereal disease. Law-
rence 0. Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies, in AIDS AND THE LAW 50-51 (Harlon
L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987). For scholarly discussions of the police power in the context of
protecting the public health, see Buris, supra note 49; Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quaran-
tine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan
& Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
139 (1988); Chris D. Nichols, Note, AIDS-A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality, 11 J.
CONTEMP. L. 315, 333-38 (1984).
51. Under most public health statutes, "quarantine" means both the isolation of the
healthy who have been exposed to an infectious disease, and also isolation of the infected.
Parmet, supra note 50, at 59.
52. Wendy A. Weber, Note, AIDS. Legal Issues in Search of a Cure, 14 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 575, 603 (1988).
53. Several state courts upheld early applications of the police power to quarantine. See,
e.g., People ex. rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815, 819 (I1. 1922) (typhoid carrier); Ex
parte Caselli, 204 P. 364, 364 (Mont. 1922) (individual with gonorrhea); Kirk v. Wyman, 65
S.E. 387, 388-90 (S.C. 1909) (leprosy victim). Mandatory vaccination laws were also upeld.
See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905); Abeel v. Clark, 24 P. 383, 384
(Cal. 1890); Duffield v. School Dist., 29 A. 742, 743 (Pa. 1894). But see Potts v. Breen, 47 N.E.
81, 85 (Ill. 1897) (holding that the state improperly enacted compulsory vaccination ordinance
in community where there was no incidence of smallpox).
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pacitated by the disease during World War L" The national priority of the
war effort prompted the development of a massive public health program
designed to contain the spread of syphilis under the leadership of the United
States Public Health Service (USPHS)."5 The program was in large part
coercive. It mandated the closing of houses of prostitution,5 6 the quarantine
and isolation of prostitutes, 57 and punitive treatment of servicemen.5" De-
spite the magnitude of this effort, evidence indicates that infection rates of
syphilis remained high during and after World War I."
B. Public Health Offenses
In addition to the involuntary measures used to control the spread of in-
fection, the states' police power was also invoked through public health stat-
utes that punished certain types of behavior by persons infected with a
communicable or venereal disease.' The definitional provisions of most
54. Examination of servicemen during induction into World War I indicated that 5.6% of
the men were infected with some type of venereal disease. Due to acquired infection during
active duty, it was approximated that 7.5% of men were infected during the War. Authorities
used these figures, because of the large population sampled, to extrapolate that approximately
10% of the United States population was infected with a venereal disease at the time of the
War. WILLIAM J. BROWN ET AL., SYPHILIS AND OTHER VENEREAL DISEASES 58 (1970).
55. Cutler & Arnold, supra note 16, at 372.
56. The military viewed brothels as a potential catastrophic health risk given the tendency
of troops to visit them during training. Brandt, supra note 14, at 375.
57. In 1918, Congress enacted the Chamberlain-Kahn Act establishing state grant pro-
grams for syphilis treatment and a federal fund to provide for civilian isolation and quarantine
by local agencies. As a result, 30,000 women were quarantined during the War as "public
health menaces." Id. at 377.
58. Treatment involved a painful injection of medication directly into the urethra. Id. at
375. Court martial often resulted if infection manifested. BROWN et al., supra note 54, at 136.
The authors suggest that it is understandable that punishment was used as a control measure
in the military since great numbers of soliders were being incapacitated in war time and in the
absence of a totally effective cure, sexual abstinence had to be encouraged. Id. at 137.
59. BROWN et al., supra note 54, at 137; DOWLING, supra note 19, at 97. The punitive
measures resulted in a decrease from 35 new cases of syphilis per 1000 persons in 1911, to 15 in
1917, but remained high in comparison with peacetime standards. Id.
60. See Gostin, supra note 50, at 49. Communicable or infectious disease statutes gener-
ally impose minimal criminal penalties for the intentional or knowing exposure of another to
one of the listed diseases. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 169-70; see, e.g., OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1192 (West 1983) (felony for intentional or reckless transmission of a desig-
nated infectious disease); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.066 (West 1990) (misde-
meanor to knowingly conceal or attempt to conceal exposure to or carrier status of a
communicable disease; misdemeanor for person infected with such a disease to attend or at-
tempt to attend a public or private place or gathering).
Venereal disease or sexually transmitted disease statutes implicitly criminalize sexual activ-
ity by an infected person. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 170. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 3198 (West 1990) (misdemeanor for person afflicted with a venereal disease to
knowingly expose himself to others); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-401(2) (1989) (unlawful for
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state public health offense statutes identify syphilis as either a venereal or
sexually transmitted disease. 6I Although most states had the statutory au-
thority to prosecute for offenses that risked the transmission of syphilis dur-
ing its epidemic years,6 2 the statutes were rarely enforced, except against
prostitutes. 63 The lack of prosecutions under these statutes may be ex-
plained by the difficulty of enforcement, and by the minor penalties imposed
for their violation." The failure of coercive solutions to control syphilis in-
fection prior to the introduction of an effective therapy after World War II
suggests that punitive public health efforts, in the absence of programs to
encourage information and treatment, were ineffective responses to the
epidemic. 65
C. Success of the Noncoercive Response
Prior to the introduction of penicillin as a treatment for syphilis, a reinvig-
orated Public Health Service sponsored a multifaceted plan of reporting,
testing, and education.66 The plan proposed confidential testing centers,
prompt therapy, sexual contact tracing, premarital testing, and a compre-
hensive program of public education that emphasized prevention, recogni-
tion of symptoms, and treatment for infection.67 The change in attitudes on
the part of the public towards syphilis-from an affliction of the immoral to
a disease of grave public health consequence-led to Congressional willing-
person with knowledge or reasonable grounds to suspect that he has a venereal disease to
willfully expose or infect another, or knowingly perform an act that exposes or infects another
person with a venereal disease); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1985) (misde-
meanor for person with knowledge of venereal disease infection to have sexual intercourse with
another); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1106 (1982) (misdemeanor to engage in sexual intercourse
when knowingly infected with venereal disease in a contagious state).
61. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-401 (1989) ("Venereal diseases; (1) Syphilis, gon-
orrhea, chancroid, granuloma inguinale, and lymphogranuloma venereum... are declared to
be contagious, infectious, communicable, and dangerous to the public health."); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-502.01 (1990) ("Sexually transmitted diseases shall include, but not be limited to,
syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, and such other sexually transmitted diseases as the Depart-
ment of Health may from time to time specify.").
62. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 170 n.91.
63. Id. at 170.
64. Id.
65. Brandt, supra note 18, at 233.
66. Brandt, supra note 14, at 378. The plan was orchestrated by Thomas Parran, the
outspoken Surgeon General appointed by President Roosevelt in 1937 to renew the USPHS
role as the focal point in protecting the public health. DOWLINO, supra note 19, at 98. The
objective of the plan was to fashion a nonmoralistic response to the syphilis epidemic and
acknowledge it as a grave health hazard. This necessitated piercing the "conspiracy of silence"




ness to fund the USPHS initiatives.68 The massive venereal disease control
program initiated by the USPHS during the 1930s69 resulted in a significant
reduction in the incidence of syphilis over the next decade.70
Success in reducing the incidence of syphilis after World War II was
shortlived.71 The sharp rise in syphilis infection rates within ten years of the
advent of penicillin led public health officials to conclude that long-term con-
trol of syphilis required a social, not a medical solution.72
III. AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE DEVASTATION OF AIDS
Fear and panic marked the initial reaction of Americans to the outbreak
of syphilis infection at the turn of the century.73 Seventy years later, modem
society, accustomed to sexually transmitted diseases and the effectiveness of
antibiotics, was shocked by the rapidly debilitating and fatal disease known
as AIDS, a disease against which antibiotics proved ineffective. 74 Society
was again forced to confront changing sexual and social values as a result of
the early incidence of AIDS cases reported among homosexual males.7 5
The hostility of a large part of the American public towards the homosex-
ual lifestyle was intensified by the AIDS outbreak. 76 Remarkably similar
reports of hysteria followed the growing AIDS epidemic despite the particu-
68. In 1938, Congress passed the La Follette-Bulwinkle Act funding the expansion of the
Venereal Disease Division of the USPHS as well as local programs. Pub. L. No. 75-540, 52
Stat. 439 (1938).
69. See Cutler & Arnold, supra note 16, at 373 (describing the National Venereal Disease
Control Program organized by Surgeon General Parran).
70. The death rate from syphilis declined from a peak of 19.1 deaths per 100,000 persons
in 1918, to 9.3 per 100,000 in 1946. DOWLING, supra note 19, at 102.
71. The number of cases of primary and secondary syphilis rose from a low of 3.8 cases
per 100,000 persons in 1957, to 7.1 in 1960, and 12.3 in 1965-virtually the same level exper-
ienced during World War I. Cutler & Arnold, supra note 16, at 375.
72. Id. Cutler and Arnold describe how the success in controlling syphilis after World
War II--especially with the advances in penicillin therapy-led Congress to conclude that
funding of full scale venereal disease control programs was no longer necessary. The authors
state that after 1958, the funding reductions were reflected in the rise in syphilis incidence as
state and local governements were forced to scale back treatment programs. Id.
73. Brandt, supra note 18, at 232.
74. Brandt describes how the insusceptibility of AIDS to antibiotics "fractured [the pub-
lic's] false sense of security." Id. at 234.
75. See Gottleib et al., supra note 2. Early scientific opinion attributed the cause of the
disease to a particular immunodeficiency characteristic of the homosexual. Id. at 1429. Ini-
tially, AIDS was known as Gay Related Immunodeficiency Complex. AIDS INFORMATION
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at foreword.
76. Homosexual males, whether or not infected with HIV, have been targets of discrimi-
nation and violence. Brandt, supra note 18, at 234. As syphilis represented a manifestation of
society's anxiety and denial of promiscuity among the masses, AIDS was seen as a metaphor
for society's discomfort with homosexuality. See generally, SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS
METAPHORS (1989).
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larized characteristic of the infected population;77 fears of AIDS contagion
through casual contact abounded. 78 HIV infection in homosexuals was be-
lieved by some to be a "just" punishment for the practice of "immoral be-
havior.",79 The anxiety and fear of contagion experienced by the American
public from the reports of the deadly virus among homosexuals was exacer-
bated by the expansion of contagion to females and heterosexuals.8s As with
syphilis, society could no longer place the blame for AIDS on those whom it
considered to violate the "moral order."
8
'
While military necessity may have stimulated the public health response
to syphilis, the early confinement of HIV infection to the male homosexual
community arguably acted as an impediment to the government's commit-
ment to AIDS research and treatment.8 2 Official recognition of the disease
as a major health issue arguably lagged evidence that AIDS would become a
major cause of death of Americans. 3
77. Although assured that HIV was not highly contagious, emergency personnel in some
areas refused to treat homosexuals. Leon Eisenberg, The Genesis of Fear: AIDS and the Pub-
lic's Response to Science, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 243, 243-45 (1986).
78. A 1985 poll found that 47% of the respondents believed that AIDS could be transmit-
ted through the sharing of a drinking glass. Brandt, supra note 18, at 234. Thirty-four percent
of the respondents to a different survey believed it was unsafe to "associate" with an AIDS
victim even when no physical contact was involved. Erik Eckholm, Poll Finds Many AIDS
Fears that Experts Say are Groundless, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 1985, at BI 1; see also Richard
Green, The Transmission of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 28 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds.,
1987) (discussing several incidents in which people believed casual contact could lead to infec-
tion with AIDS, including where a court required a defendant with AIDS to wear surgical
mask at trial, and where a television crew agreed to tape an interview with AIDS patients only
upon the condition that the microphones would be thrown away after the interview).
79. Brandt, supra note 18, at 235.
80. Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 245.
81. Public awareness of HIV infections resulting from blood transfusions, infected
mothers of newborns, and other conduct that was neither sexual nor drug related dissipated
the moralizing of HIV infection. Id.
82. Brandt, supra note 18, at 235. Some commentators spoke out against government
funding of AIDS research. Patrick Buchanan, a former speechwriter for President Reagan
stated: "The poor homosexuals-they have declared war upon Nature and now Nature is ex-
acting an awful retribution." Id. William F. Buckley, Jr., Editor of the National Review,
recommended mandatory universal screening and tatooing of HIV positive individuals on their
forearms and buttocks to warn those who might share needles or have sex with such individu-
als. Id. at 236.
An analysis of the early research commitment to AIDS by Randy Shilts is a poignant illus-
tration of the alleged delay in AIDS program funding:
[I]n 1982, the National Institutes of Health's [NIH] research on Toxic Shock Syn-
drome, a mystery that had by then been solved, amounted to $36,100 per death.
NIH's Legionnaire's spending in the most recent fiscal year amounted to $34,841 per
death. By contrast, the health institute had spent about $3,225 per AIDS death in
fiscal 1981 and $8,991 in fiscal 1982.
RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 186 (1987).
83. In May, 1983 (two years after initial reports of AIDS deaths), then Health and
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Coincident with the first major AIDS funding bill, 4 then Surgeon Gen-
eral C. Everett Koop authored a comprehensive governmental report on the
epidemiology of AIDS, behavior modification guidelines to reduce the risk
of infection, and educational and monitoring programs to be sponsored by
the government.8 5 The Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune De-
ficiency Syndrome declared that AIDS would produce "profound changes"
in society-a comment echoed fifty years earlier when the government began
its public health response to syphilis.86 After establishing a national strategy
for action, the report rejected the use of several proposed measures to con-
trol the epidemic; many of these represented the earlier ineffective and mor-
alistic responses to syphilis.8 7 In 1988, the Presidential Commission on the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic 8 released its final report.8 9 The
Human Services Assistant Secretary Edward N. Brandt indicated that "AIDS ha[d] become
the number one [health] priority." AIDS INFORMATION SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 3.
President Reagan's first public speech on AIDS was delivered in 1987. Id. at 11.
84. The Health Omnibus Programs Extension (AIDS Amendments) Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3062 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Act directed
$1.2 billion in state grants to fund programs in counselling, testing, healthcare services, educa-
tion and preventive programs, and development of model protocols for clinical care of infected
individuals. Gostin, supra note 8, at 1621.
The Act also established The National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome as the successor to the President's Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome. National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Act, Pub. L. 100-
607, 102 Stat. 3062, 3104 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300cc) [hereinafter National Commis-
sion]. The Act charged the National Commission with monitoring the implementation of the
recommendations of the Presidential Commission. Id. In addition, the National Commission
must evaluate the adequacy of, and make recommendations regarding 1) issues of healthcare
and research relating to AIDS; 2) dissemination of AIDS information; 3) behavior changes
needed to combat AIDS; 4) federal and state laws on civil rights relating to AIDS; 5) federal
research, treatment and education programs; and 6) international coordination and coopera-
tion concerning AIDS data collection, research, and treatment. Id. § 243. The Act called for
the creation of a fifteen member commission to be composed of five individuals appointed each
by the President, House, and Senate on the basis that the selected persons be "specially quali-
fied to serve ... by reason of their education, training, or experience." Id. § 244.
85. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., supra note 4.
86. Id. at 28; Brandt, supra note 14, at 376.
87. The report stated that compulsory blood testing of individuals is unnecessary given
the cost and likelihood of producing false positive and false negative results. U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., supra note 4, at 33. It also rejected quarantine as a control
measure since AIDS is not spread by casual contact. However, quarantine did remain a local
government alternative to prevent intentional exposure by recalcitrant HIV carriers. Id. In
addition, the report rejected identification of AIDS patients by physical marking as a discrimi-
natory artifice. Id.
88. THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS: THE
REPORT OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC (1988) (hereinafter PRESIDEN-
TIAL REPORT]. President Reagan appointed the Commission in May, 1987. AIDS INFORMA-
TION SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 11. The 13 member commission included congressional,
business, academic, religious, public health, and administration officials. Kristine M. Gebbie,
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report presented a detailed national strategy to combat AIDS, including rec-
ommendations and means to reduce the further spread of HIV, manage the
care of HIV infected individuals, and enhance the nation's efforts to find a
cure.9° The report also advocated criminalization of acts that risk transmis-
sion of HIV to another person. 91 By 1989, all fifty states had enacted some
form of AIDS legislation dealing with reporting,92 education,93 or testing.94
AIDS-related public health programs have produced early success. 95
The President's Commission on AIDS: What Did it Do?, 79 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 868, 868
(1989). The President charged the Commission with the mission of informing the President,
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and other cabinet members of
the public health dangers from the spread of HIV and resulting illnesses, including medical,
legal, ethical, social, and economic impacts. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra, at 193. In addi-
tion, the President requested that the Commission recommend measures that federal, state,
and local officials could take to protect the public, assist in finding a cure, and care for those
with the disease. Id. at 70. Finally, the Commission was to assess educational efforts, analyze
governmental response, review the United States history of dealing with communicable dis-
ease, evaluate the current state of AIDS research, and examine policies for the development of
drugs. Id.
89. AIDS INFORMATION SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 13.
90. The Commission's recommendations seek to
strike a proper balance between our obligation as a society toward those members of
society who have HIV, and those members of society who do not. To slow or stop
the spread of the virus, to provide proper medical care for those who have contracted
the virus, and protect the rights of both infected and non-infected persons....
PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 88, at XVII.
More specifically, the Commission advocated increased research funding, public access to
voluntary testing, institution of partner notification programs, integration of educational pro-
grams with drug programs, and sponsorship of efforts by state governments to strengthen laws
criminalizing the intentional transmission of AIDS. Id.
91. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 130. The Commission pointed out the
problems of prosecution under traditional criminal law statutes and recommended the enact-
ment of AIDS-specific statutes that prosecute individuals who "knowingly conduct themselves
in ways that pose a significant risk of transmission to others." Id. The Commission cautioned
that "criminal sanctions for HIV transmission must be carefully drawn, must be directed only
towards behavior which is scientifically established as a mode of transmission, and should be
employed only when all other public health and civil actions fail to produce responsible behav-
ior." Id.
92. Statutes in all fifty states require reporting of all AIDS cases to public health officials.
Gostin, supra note 8, at 1626. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1402 (Supp. 1990); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 384.25 (West Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-609 (Supp. 1991).
93. AIDS education and counselling on the prevention of HIV transmission are among
the priorities of the government's public health response to AIDS. See 134 CONG. REC.
S15690-S15712 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (debating amendment to the Public Health Service
Act). Most states have enacted measures mandating AIDS education. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 22-25-104 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.2319 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-143 (Michie Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-22-17 (1988).
94. See, e.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-415 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609
(West Supp. 1991); GA. STAT. ANN. § 31-17A-2 (Michie 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-12
(1989).
95. The incidence of HIV infection among white homosexual males has decreased over
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Nevertheless, political and moral challenges to the substance of education
programs96 and the politics of funding97 jeopardize the achievement of gov-
ernmental objectives.98 The conflict between politicians and public health
experts over the effectiveness of coercive programs and criminal sanctions in
the AIDS public health strategy is especially threatening to the success of
these programs.99 Using the historical antecedent of the public health re-
sponse to syphilis, the comprehensive public health strategies which focused
on voluntary testing and education to combat syphilis infection may also,
over time, be successful in controlling the spread of AIDS.cOO Furthermore,
the past several years; however, rates of infection among other sectors of the population con-
tinue to rise. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 3, at 43. See also Becker & Joseph, supra
note 30, at 407 (finding statistical correlation between level of knowledge about AIDS and
behavior change).
96. Congress incorporated a modified version of a controversial amendment sponsored by
Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) into the 1988 Act forbidding the funding of any AIDS preven-
tion programs that "promote or encourage, directly, homosexual or heterosexual sexual activ-
ity or intravenous substance use." 1988 AIDS Amendments, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat.
3062, 3093 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee). A suit filed against the Department of Health and
Human Services sought to invalidate restrictions on the content of AIDS educational pro-
grams as an infringement on their constitutional right to freedom of expression. Lawrence 0.
Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project, 263 JAMA 1961, 1961 (1990) (discussing Gay Men's
Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 1989 WL 156303 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). The New York Court of Ap-
peals recently heard a challenge by a devout religious group to New York's mandatory AIDS
education program claiming it violated their First Amendment right to freedom of religion.
Ware v. Valley St. High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 422 (N.Y. 1989).
97. Appropriations initially authorized for the CARE Act were $875 million per year for
five years. However, prior to final approval, Congress set budgeted appropriations at $221
million for 1991. Panel Approves Large Cut in AIDS Relief Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1990, at
A2. Congress approved only $144 million in CARE funds for 1991 by the expiration of the
101st Congress. Congress Sets $1.9 Billion AIDS Budget, Approves Immigration, Orphan Drug
Bills, 5 AIDS POL. & L. (BNA) No. 20, at 1-2 (Oct. 31, 1990).
98. Public health experts are critical of restrictions on AIDS educational programs that
"impede the ability of public officials to disseminate effective AIDS prevention materials."
Gostin, supra note 8, at 1624.
99. In 1986, then Surgeon General Koop rejected suggestions that mandatory reporting of
persons infected with HIV be part of the national strategy. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUM. SERVS., supra note 4, at 30. In 1988, The Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus recommended criminalization of conduct risking HIV transmission.
PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 130. The basis for the conflict, in part, stems from
the concern that criminal sanctions may undermine public health goals by diverting attention
and resources from effective prevention programs, and inhibit people from seeking testing. Id.
See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., supra note 4, at 30. The 1991 report of
The National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome is noticeably void of
recommendations to pursue coercive measures in future AIDS programs. See NAT'L COMM'N
ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, supra note 32.
100. The National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome stated that
"prevention is currently our only hope of altering the course of the HIV epidemic and ...
efforts in this sector have been grossly underutilized .... NAT'L COMM'N ON ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, supra note 32, at 1.
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this nation's experience with syphilis demonstrates that disproportional
spending on research aimed at discovering a curative treatment for AIDS-
at the expense of substantial appropriations for education, information, and
treatment-is unlikely to be the optimal public health response.'01
IV. AIDS AND THE POLICE POWER
A. AIDS Public Health Law: Jacobson Revisited
The police power has been invoked to some degree by every state to pro-
tect the public from the spread of HIV."°2 Public health officials have criti-
cized compulsory HIV screening as unnecessarily intrusive because it is
generally ineffective 10 3 and impedes efforts to encourage participation in vol-
untary testing and educational programs."° Nevertheless, a mandatory
HIV testing statute was recently upheld by the California Court of Appeals
in Love v. Superior Court despite a constitutional challenge that it violated
the Fourth Amendment, the due process clause, and the equal protection
clause.'0 5 Relying on Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Love court accorded
a large degree of deference to the legislature's efforts to adopt means for
preventing the spread of contagious diseases.'0 7 The Jacobson standard,
however, has been criticized as outdated.'0 8 First, it fails to reflect contem-
101. See DOWLING, supra note 19, at 148 (stating that despite the wide availability of an
effective cure, rates of syphilis infection rose with the liberalization of attitudes towards sex,
and with variations in the level of funding of public health programs). The National Commis-
sion on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome stated:
[P]revention strategies will remain key even after the development of effective drugs
or vaccines. There are valuable lessons to be learned from earlier experiences with
sexually transmitted diseases. Effective and inexpensive treatments for many of these
diseases have long been available, yet drugs alone have not stemmed the tide of
infections[.]
NAT'L COMM'N ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, supra note 32, at 1.
102. See supra notes 92-95.
103. Gostin, supra note 8, at 1625. This is especially true in the case of mandatory testing
as a condition of marriage. Gostin cites results of a survey in Illinois that found only five
confirmed positive HIV test results among 44,726 marriage applicants. Id. Another study
estimated the cost of each positive result at $60,000 to $100,000. Id. Finally, premarital
screening is ineffective to prevent transmission since sexual activity occurs outside of marriage.
Id.
104. Id. at 1627.
105. 276 Cal. Rptr. 660, 662 (1990) (upholding compulsory HIV testing and counselling of
convicted prostitute upheld as reasonable promotion of legitimate government interest).
106. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
107. Love v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
108. Buris, supra note 49, at 495-96 (citing case law demonstrating courts' movement to-
wards adopting medical criteria to assess legitimacy of the states' exercise of their public health
power).
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porary notions of due process, equal protection, and the right to privacy.' ° 9
Second, the medical reasonableness standard of review has been more
strictly applied by courts since Jacobson. 1o Nevertheless, Jacobson remains
the judicial standard and allows legislators to attempt to control an epidemic
through coercive measures, including criminalization, that have been re-
jected by public health professionals.'1 1
States have used three statutory alternatives to prosecute individuals for
acts risking HIV transmission that will satisfy the federal requirement under
CARE.1 2 These include: 1) traditional criminal law statutes," 3 2) public
offense statutes that incorporate HIV infection into the definition of sexually
transmittable diseases, and 3) AIDS-specific statutes proscribing particular
acts by HIV infected persons.
B. Traditional Criminal Law
Criminal law objectives of punishment and deterrence may reasonably be
served by extending liability and criminal penalties to HIV infected individu-
als who act in a manner likely to infect another with HIV. "4 The transmis-
sion of the deadly virus will result in a harm not unlike that inflicted by any
other criminal behavior." 5 Therefore, legislators should define standards of
conduct in order to punish those who fail to comply with such standards and
deter others from engaging in activities likely to transmit HIV to others." 6
In theory, any person who 1) commits or attempts to commit an act that
infects another, accompanied by the statutorily defined mental state, and 2)
has the potential of causing harm or death to another could be prose-
109. Gray, supra note 49, at 516-17; see also Weber, supra note 52, at 609-11.
110. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (upholding ordinance requiring vaccina-
tion in absence of imminent presence of epidemic); Board of Health of Covington v. Kollman,
160 S.W. 1052 (Ky. 1913) (upholding quarantine based on reliability of laboratory evidence of
infection). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in School Board of Nassau County Florida
v. Arline stated: "[C]ourts may reasonably be expected normally to defer to the judgments of
public health officials ... unless those judgments are medically unsupportable." 480 U.S. 273,
286 n.15 (1987). See generally, Buris, supra note 49, at 488-96.
111. Gostin, supra note 8, at 1629 ("[P]olitical pressures on legislators to use the coercive
powers of the state to combat the [AIDS] epidemic are unmistakable.").
112. 104 Stat. 576. The CARE framework represents a statutory minimum that permits
prosecutions for the commission of enumerated acts. States may use their police powers under
new or existing statutes to prosecute individuals for these acts. Id. § 2647.
113. Every state could theoretically charge a person with the intentional transmission of
disease through the use of traditional criminal law statutes including murder, attempted mur-
der, assault, or reckless endangerment. See Gene Schultz, AIDS: Public Health and the Crimi-
nal Law, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 65, 80-97 (1988).
114. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 130.
115. Gostin, supra note 8, at 1627.
116. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 130.
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cuted." 7 To be convicted of criminal homicide,' 18 a person must either: 1)
purposely commit an act with the desire that the act infect another with
HIV; 2) know that he or she carried the HIV virus, and commit an act that
risks HIV infection with the knowledge that this act could infect and kill
another; or 3) be aware of both the risk that he or she was infected with HIV
and that the act committed could infect and kill another, and commit an act
demonstrating disregard for human life."1 9 In addition to the mental state
requirements, the act committed must cause the victim's death.1 20
Murder requires the highest level of culpability for prosecution. 2' While
it is conceivable that a purposeful or knowing murder by HIV transmission
could be proven,122 the difficulty of proving intent 123 and causation would be
significant.' 24 The level of culpability for manslaughter will more likely be
met when a person, not intending to kill another, commits an HIV transmit-
ting act while aware of the actual or likely infection, thus demonstrating a
disregard for human life. 125  One may be charged with manslaughter when
the death of a person results from HIV transmission by a person who reck-
lessly infects another with knowledge of his HIV status, but the state of
mind falls below extreme indifference to the value of human life. 126 Finally,
117. Most criminal statutes require that both a physical act and mens rea (requisite mental
state) be present to prosecute the accused. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4, at 212 (2d ed. 1986).
118. Under the Model Penal Code, homicide includes, in descending grade of culpability,
murder, manslaughter, and in some jurisdictions, negligent homicide. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.1(2) (1962).
119. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 162-67.
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1962).
121. The Model Penal Code defines murder as "the killing of another human being either
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l)(b) (1962). To be convicted of
homicide, the defendant must have the requesite mental state with regard to each element of
the offense. Id.
122. Examples of when mens rea could be proven include a prostitute who knows that he
or she is infected with HIV and continues to have sex knowing that the client may become
infected; or an HIV infected person who commits rape knowing that the victim may become
infected. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 164.
123. Purposeful or knowing infection with HIV would be extremely difficult or impossible
to prove because the likelihood of transmitting HIV to another person as a result of one sexual
encounter is unknown and only a limited number of acts possess any scientific possibility of
contagion. Friedland & Klein, supra note 23, at 1125-29.
124. Death following HIV infection may not occur for several years. Sullivan & Field,
supra note 50, at 165-66. Some states limit the statute of limitations for homicide to one year
and a day. Id. at 166. Furthermore, the difficulty of pinpointing infection to a single exposure
by the perpetrator would be immense. Id.
125. Id. at 163.
126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(a) (1962); see also Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at
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negligent homicide requires the lowest level of culpability;127 a conviction
could result if a person infects another with HIV by disregarding the risk of
infection of which he should be aware. This would be a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the
situation. 2' Reckless or negligent culpability requirements afford great lati-
tude in setting a standard of care against which to measure a defendant's
conduct.1 29 This situation creates the likelihood of subjective assessment of
a defendant's conduct by the jury, allowing any prejudices and fears of con-
tagion to influence the decision, because no definitive objective quantum of
transmission risk or appropriate standard governing reasonableness exists in
this particular situation.1 30
Criminal statutes may also be used to prosecute HIV-transmitting con-
duct that does not result in death or infection."' Prosecutors may charge a
defendant with assault for culpable conduct that does not result in bodily
injury.1 32 A defendant can be charged with aggravated assault if he causes
or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another either purposely, know-
ingly, or recklessly manifesting indifference to the value of human life.1 33
The homicide and assault models suffer from similar shortcomings when
applied to the act of HIV transmission. Current medical knowledge is in-
compatible with a finding that a person could act, on every occasion, with
the knowledge that HIV infection of another could result from the activity.
Proof that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind requires proof
of infection and proof that the virus could be transmitted through the indi-
vidual's conduct.134 In the absence of conclusive medical data about the risk
of transmission of HIV by a particular act, it is impossible for a person to
intend or know that his conduct will infect another. 135 Moreover, when the
highest grade of the offense of homicide or assault depends on the defend-
ant's knowledge of infection, prosecutions under these statutes would serve
to discourage persons from using public health services to determine their
HIV status and seek treatment and counselling. 136
127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4(1) (1962).
128. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 164-65.
129. Id. at 166.
130. Id.
131. Schultz, supra note 113, at 97.
132. Id. The Model Penal Code defines bodily injury as "physical pain, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(2) (1962).
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(a) (1962).
134. Schultz, supra note 113, at 82.
135. Id. at 83. The risk of HIV infection as a result of a single or several sexual encounters
is unknown. Friedland & Klein, supra note 23, at 1129. Similarly, infection through intrave-
nous drug use is related to repeated exposures to contaminated blood. Id. at 1128.
136. Ifa defendant had been tested for HIV prior to the alleged conduct, prosecutors could
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C Public Health Offenses
Public health offense statutes provide an alternate means of imposing
criminal liability for HIV risking behavior under the public health derivative
of the state police power. On their face, these statutes are appropriately nar-
row; they typically impose criminal liability for the intentional or knowing
exposure of another to HIV. 3 Nevertheless, the statutes are overinclusive
with respect to HIV since they potentially criminalize casual contacts that
pose no risk of HIV infection.138 Statutes that proscribe casual contacts that
have no medically documented risk of causing infection appear to fail the
Jacobson reasonableness standard for government restrictions on personal
autonomy. Under these statutes, the criminalization of sexual intercourse
where a person knows of his HIV infection also may infringe on constitu-
tionally protected privacy interests. 139 Some public health offense statutes
make it unlawful to perform any act that exposes another to infection, but
fail to specify the proscribed acts or to define "exposure." 1" In addition,
lenient penalty provisions present significant shortcomings in proscribing
acts of intentional HIV transmission."'4 The incurability of AIDS requires a
establish that the defendant either had knowledge of his infection or at least an awareness of
the likelihood of infection.
137. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 171; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West Supp.
1991) (adding AIDS and HIV to general venereal disease statute and prohibiting infected per-
sons from having sexual intercourse without informing their partners).
138. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 171. Sullivan and Field also assert that statutes
that include HIV infection as a sexually transmitted venereal disease are underinclusive since
they do not account for the other modes of HIV transmission. Id.
139. The Supreme Court has never held that sexual intercourse is a fundamental right; it
has, however, protected areas involving personal autonomy and intimate contact in the context
of access to birth control, procreation, and abortion by requiring strict scrutiny of any state
law that infringes on these fundamental interests. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (in-
validating state law limiting woman's choice of abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (extending right to possess contraceptives to unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating state law barring use of contraceptives by married
couples); but cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to find a fundamental right
to homosexual sodomy).
140. See ALA. CODE § 22-11A-21(c) (1990) (making unlawful the knowing transmission,
assumption of the risk of transmission, or performance of any act which will probably or likely
transmit a sexually transmitted disease to another); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West
Supp. 1991) (making unlawful the engagement by a person in any activity with the intent to
infect or to cause to be infected another person with HIV); see also W. VA. CODE § 16-4-20
(1991) (making unlawful the performance by a person suffering from an infectious venereal
disease of any act which exposes another to infection). These broadly worded statutes may
encourage abortions since a mother could be prosecuted if she delivers an HIV infected baby
after finding out that she is infected with HIV. See Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman,
Are AIDS-Transmission Laws Encouraging Abortion?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at 77.
141. Most of these statutes carry misdemeanor penalties. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50,
at 171. But cf. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West Supp. 1991) (punishing the intentional
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more severe penalty if the objective is to deter others from behavior that
risks HIV transmission. 142 In summary, HIV and curable venereal diseases
are incompatibly grouped together under existing statutes that criminalize
acts of intentional exposure or infection of others with a contagious disease.
In most cases it will be difficult to overcome the obstacles under tradi-
tional criminal law and public health offense statutes to successfully prose-
cute persons engaging in behavior that presents a risk of HIV transmission.
One study showed that courts dismissed a majority of cases brought under
public health offense statutes because of the difficulty of proving intent to
transmit HIV. 43 Other cases in which persons have been prosecuted for
conduct that risks HIV transmission have been brought under the assault
model for spitting at or biting another person.'" These acts, though com-
mitted maliciously, are extremely unlikely modes of HIV transmission.
45
Imposition of harsh penalties for acts that may not be criminal in the ab-
sence of AIDS 146 reflects the hysteria engendered by the disease rather than
application of appropriate sanctions for dangerous behavior.'
47
The issue of consent is an additional shortcoming to the use of criminal
statutes to control the spread of HIV infection. The defense of consent is
available under the Model Penal Code only if the injury is reasonably forsee-
able.' 48 Consent to sexual intercourse does not imply consent to the possi-
exposure of another person to the AIDS virus with a maximum fine of $5000 dollars, or a
maximum prison term (with or without hard labor) of ten years).
142. Classification of the proscribed act as a felony would be more appropriate.
143. Gostin, supra note 8, at 1627.
144. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Politics of AIDS Compulsory State Powers, Public Health,
and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1017-58 (1989); see, e.g., United States v. Moore,
846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding conviction of HIV-infected prisoner for assault with
a deadly and dangerous weapon-his mouth and teeth-for biting two correctional officers);
Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (convicting man infected with HIV for
assault with intent to commit murder for biting forearm of police officer during an arrest);
State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding attempted murder conviction
of man infected with HIV who tried to infect others by biting, scratching, and throwing
blood).
145. Berkelman, supra note 4, at 766 ("[Ihe risk of HIV transmission following exposure
to saliva is extremely low, if not zero .... "). At least one court has taken judicial notice of the
fact that teeth are not deadly weapons for the purpose of an aggravated assault prosecution.
Brock v. State, 555 S.2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (overturning aggravated assault convic-
tion where record did not support conclusion that biting could transmit HIV). But cf. United
States v. Moore, 846 F.2d at 1167 (teeth are dangerous weapons within context of aggravated
assault statute regardless of whether defendant was infected with HIV).
146. While biting meets the simple assault definition under the Model Penal Code, spitting
probably does not. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211. l(a) (1962) ("A person is guilty of assault if he
attempts to cause or... causes bodily injury to another[.]"). Bodily injury includes physical
pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition. Id. § 210.0(2).
147. Schultz, supra note 113, at 112.
148. Id. at 106.
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bility of infliction of serious bodily injury. 4 9 Therefore, the defense may not
be available if infection results from sexual intercourse unless the risk of
possible HIV infection is fully disclosed to the partner and prophylactics are
used. 1
50
Since most HIV transmitting acts are consensual, 5 ' criminal statutes ef-
fectively criminalize risks accepted by individuals.'" 2 Under current public
health law precedent, these risks, even if protected by a constitutional right
to privacy, would likely be overridden by the police power authority of the
states to control contagion.' 3 Hence, providing a defense of informed con-
sent in statutes that criminalize sexual activity by persons with knowledge of
their HIV infection would likely discourage dangerous behavior by eliminat-
ing the disincentive for such persons to discover their HIV status and pro-
mote the use of prophylactic devices. '
D. The AIDS-Specific Statute
The obstacles to prosecuting HIV transmitting activities under traditional
criminal law' 55 and the inappropriateness of applying public health statutes
to AIDS have led several states to draft AIDS-specific statutes that dispense
with the difficulty of proving intent by proscribing particular acts by persons
who know that they are infected with HIV.156 These statutes generally im-
pose criminal liability on persons who intend to infect another by commit-
ting specific acts that are medically proven modes of transmitting HIV, or
who, knowing of their HIV-positive status, commit such acts even if the
intent to infect another is absent.'5 7 Most AIDS-specific statutes provide a
149. Id.
150. The defense of consent is inapplicable to infection by illicit intravenous drug use be-
cause the Model Penal Code disallows consent to commit illegal activities. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.11(2)(b) (1962).
151. The Centers for Disease Control does not compile data on HIV transmission as a
result of rape. Telephone Interview with staff member of National AIDS Information Hotline
(Oct. 10, 1991). However, one study conducted by CDC found that when females with no
known risk factor to HIV became infected, the infection was not attributable to sexual assault.
Mark Blumberg, Transmission of the AIDS Virus Through Criminal Activity, 25 CRIM. L.
BULL. 454, 459 (1989). Where the conduct is non-consensual, e.g., rape, criminal laws already
impose harsh penalties to deter and punish such conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.1(1) (1962) (classifying forcible rape of a female by a male as a first degree felony).
152. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 158.
153. Id. at 174.
154. Schultz, supra note 113, at 107.
155. Gostin, supra note 8, at 1627.
156. Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 369-70 (1990).
157. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 384.24 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (Michie Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN.
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defense of consent that is met if the actors have informed their partners of
their condition and of the risk involved in the activity, or if persons donating
body fluids, tissues, or organs have been told by a physician that they are not
infected with HIV.158
The AIDS-specific statute appears to be the best method to establish a
coercive public health response to control the spread of HIV infection. 59
Such a statute more narrowly proscribes the conduct likely to infect another
with HIV by focusing on the act, rather than on the result. Consequently,
the statute serves as a clear warning to HIV infected individuals that they
must fully disclose their HIV status before engaging in HIV-transmitting
behavior. " By limiting the state of mind requirement to the highest level of
culpability,' 6 ' the statute eliminates the overly broad reach of lower grade
criminal statutes that penalize reckless or negligent transmission of HIV and
§ 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Idaho is an example of one of the more comprehensive
AIDS-specific statutes:
(1) Any person who exposes another in any manner with the intent to infect, or
knowing that he or she is or has been afflicted with acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS), AIDS related complexes (ARC), or other manifestations of
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, transfers or attempts to transfer any
of his or her body fluid, body tissue, or organs to another person is guilty of a felony
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a period not to exceed
fifteen (15) years, by fine not in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both
such imprisonment and fine.
(2) DEFINmOrNS. As used in this section:
(a) "Body Fluid" means semen .... blood, saliva, vaginal secretion, breast milk,
and urine.
(b) "Transfer" means engaging in sexual activity by genital-genital contact, oral-
genital contact, anal-genital contact; or permitting the use of a hypodermic syr-
inge, needle, or similar device without sterilization; or giving, whether or not for
value, blood, semen, body tissue, or organs to a person, blood bank, hospital, or
other medical care facility for purposes of transfer to another person.
(3) DEFENSES:
(a) Consent. It is an affirmative defense that the sexual activity took place between
consenting adults after full disclosure by the accused of the risk of such activity.
(b) Medical advice. It is an affirmative defense that the transfer of body fluid,
body tissue, or organs occurred after advice from a licensed physician that the
accused was noninfectious.
IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1991).
158. See IDAHO CODE § 39-608(3)(a), supra note 157; see also Sullivan & Field, supra note
50, at 172.
159. See PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 130 ("An HIV-specific statute ...
would provide clear notice of socially unacceptable behavior specific to the HIV epidemic and
tailor punishment to the specific crime of HIV transmission.").
160. Sullivan & Field, supra note 50, at 172, 181.
161. Most HIV specific statutes make it a criminal offense to knowingly or purposely en-
gage in behavior that exposes another to the risk of HIV infection. Hermann, supra note 156,
at 370.
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are prone to manipulation by juries.'62 By criminalizing intentional con-
duct, the statute does not penalize individuals for learning their HIV status
because acting with the knowledge of infection alone is not proscribed if the
actor has fully informed a consenting partner of the risks of HIV transmis-
sion. 163 The more severe penalties imposed under these statutes compared
to those under public health statutes reflect the life-threatening consequence
of HIV transmission and therefore may have a stronger deterrent effect.
Most importantly, an AIDS-specific statute that incorporates a defense of
informed consent recognizes that HIV infection occurs predominantly
through consensual sexual contact. 64 As a result, constitutional privacy
protections relating to intimate personal contact are less likely to be invoked
upon challenges to the statutes in court.
The appropriateness of criminalizing HIV transmitting behavior remains
controversial.165 However, recent federal legislation requiring states to have
the capability to prosecute HIV-transmitting behavior in order to receive
emergency AIDS funding has limited the debate to how to criminalize,
rather than whether to criminalize. 166 While traditional criminal law stat-
utes and public health statutes are available to impose criminal liability, each
162. For instance, a jury could convict a defendant of a criminal offense that merely re-
quires a negligent state of mind if it believes that the defendant should have been aware of his
infection. This would sidestep the requirement that the prosecutor prove that the defendant
had knowledge of his infection, allowing a jury great latitude in imposing its own moral code
on a defendant's activities. See Sullivan and Field, supra note 50, at 179.
163. However, a broadly drafted public health statute may impose liability on such a per-
son if, with the knowledge of his HIV infection, the individual engages in an act that the
legislature considers likely to transmit HIV. See supra note 140.
164. See Berkelman, supra note 4, at 762, 765 (finding that over 60% of reported AIDS
cases occurred among homosexual/bisexual males, an additional 5% of reported cases occur
as a result of heterosexual activity).
165. Several prominent public health and legal experts oppose criminalization: "The use of
coercive powers, far from accomplishing the ostensible objective of impeding the AIDS epi-
demic, could well fuel it." Gostin, supra note 8, at 1629. Schultz states that "any attempt to
press the criminal law into service for the purpose of furthering the public health goal of
reducing the spread of the AIDS virus will be expensive, ineffective, and counterproductive."
Schultz, supra note 113, at 113. Sullivan and Field cite the threat of "massive government
intrusion into sexual privacy" and the danger of "selective prosecution and misuse of criminal
law to harass unpopular groups" as costs of AIDS criminalization. Sullivan and Field, supra
note 50, at 187. Conversely, law enforcement and elected officials cite the need to protect the
population from infection by the intentional acts of HIV infected persons as the rationale for
criminal measures. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL REPORT supra note 88, at 130 (stating that HIV-
infected individuals who act in a manner that poses a significant risk of infection to another
must be held responsible for their actions as are those persons who act outside the criminal
law's established parameters of acceptable behavior).
166. The CARE Act effectively requires states to have the capability to prosecute individu-
als for acts that risk HIV infection by making grants of emergency AIDS funds contingent
upon a showing of this capability. See supra note 11.
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appears ill-suited to impose criminal liability for HIV transmission. An
AIDS-specific statute that limits the proscribed acts, imposes liability for
only purposeful or intentional infection, and includes a defense of consent
represents the best method to criminalize HIV transmission.
Nevertheless, even the most narrowly drawn statute proscribing behavior
medically proven to transmit HIV is not likely to be an effective weapon in
the public health effort to control the spread of HIV infection. The statute
may enable law enforcement officials to prosecute individuals who attempt
to infect another with HIV. 167 However, such a statute will be virtually
unenforceable because of the private nature of the acts proscribed and the
inherent difficulty of proving that a person had knowledge of his infection at
the time the act was committed. 168 In addition, while consensual sexual in-
tercourse between an HIV infected person and another person informed of
the risk of HIV transmission may protect the infected person from criminal
liability, the absence of an additional requirement that the partners use pro-
phylactics to guard against HIV transmission does little to control the
spread of infection.1 69 Finally, consensual sexual activity between two peo-
ple, entirely legal prior to the AIDS crisis, would become criminal upon a
determination of a party's HIV positive status. Implicitly, this person would
be discouraged from being tested for HIV. 7 °
Perhaps most importantly, AIDS-specific statutes will do little to deter
acts that risk HIV infection among the populations where HIV infection is
growing most rapidly-heterosexual minorities in urban areas and intrave-
nous drug users and their sexual partners. 7 ' These groups are the least
167. Dr. Lawrence 0. Gostin, who tracks all AIDS related cases for the AIDS Litigation
Project of The Department of Health and Human Services, estimates that the total number of
criminal cases brought in civilian and military courts is more than 200. Rorie Sherman, Crimi-
nal Prosecutions on AIDS Growing, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 3. However, Gostin states
that "[he is] personally not aware of one case in which there has been an actual transmis-
sion[.]" Id. at 38.
168. The prosecution must prove knowledge of infection at the time of the act. One of the
only methods of proving this is to subpoena medical records indicating that a person was
tested and informed that he was infected with HIV. Schultz, supra note 113, at 110 n.212.
However, in cases where persons have reason to suspect they are infected with HIV, knowl-
edge may be inferred if such persons willfully ignore the likelihood of infection. Sullivan and
Field, supra note 50, at 184.
169. Sullivan and Field, supra note 50, at 183 (asserting that requiring the use of prophy-
lactics would help contain the spread of the disease and protect the sexual partner who may
not understand the risk that they consented to).
170. Hermann, supra note 156, at 357.
171. Friedland & Klein, supra note 23, at 1133. See generally Ellie E. Schoenbaum, et al.,
Risk Factors for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in Intravenous Drug Users, 321
NEW ENG. J. MED. 874 (1989); O'Brien, supra note 10 (describing the increasing incidence of
AIDS among innercity minority populations).
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likely to participate in public health programs to discover their HIV status
and to take the appropriate precautions encouraged by the AIDS-specific
statute. 172 Therefore, the AIDS-specific statute should not be used by states
as the sole means of attempting to control the spread of HIV infection, but
rather as one measure in the overall public health response to the spread of
HIV infection. The statutes should serve to effectively inform society of the
acts most likely to transmit HIV; proscribe only the most culpable conduct,
thereby assuaging the continuing public fear of contagion by casual contact;
and encourage, not inhibit, participation in testing and treatment programs.
V. CONCLUSION
The syphilis epidemic suffered by the American population in the early
years of the twentieth century prompted a coercive public health response
aimed at isolating and punishing persons suspected of accelerating infection
through their activity. Later programs informed, educated, tested, and
counselled the public about the disease, and, in combination with effective
treatments, significantly controlled its spread. The common mode of sexual
transmission of syphilis and AIDS, and the similar responses the diseases
evoke in the public, make a comparison of the public health response to
syphilis and AIDS instructive in view of the recent federal mandate to
criminalize the intentional transmission of AIDS.
The importance of commitment to public health programs to combat the
spread of AIDS over the long term, rather than as a short term response in
advance of a curative treatment, is reinforced by the recent significant in-
crease in incidence of syphilis, despite the wide availability of penicillin. A
review of the public health response to syphilis indicates that the coercive
elements were unsuccessful in comparison with noncoercive programs. Sev-
eral of the noncoercive programs initiated in the syphilis era have achieved
some early success in the fight to control HIV infection. If these programs
are to continue to be successful, their objectives must not be thwarted by the
172. See O'Brien, supra note 10 (citing the financial burden on innercity public health care
systems limiting access to AIDS programs). In November, 1991, professional basketball star
Earvin "Magic" Johnson announced that he had tested positive for HIV and would retire
immediately from the game. Richard W. Stevenson, Magic Johnson Retires, Saying he has
AIDS Infection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at Al. The announcement by Johnson, a black
athlete and role model to thousands of young Americans, is expected to increase awareness of
AIDS, especially among young blacks Americans. Michael Specter, Magic's Loud Message
For Young Black Men, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at B12. Health officials hope that Johnson's
announcement will further assist the black community-a group "disproportionately affected
by the disease yet the hardest to reach through education efforts"-in overcoming the stigma
of AIDS as a disease limited to homosexuals and drug abusers and encourage the community
to seek AIDS information and counselling. Id.
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use of criminal statutes that perpetuate the public's fears that HIV can be
transmitted by casual contact or make knowledge of HIV infection an ele-
ment of the offense. Statutes that criminalize virtually any act by persons
who know of their HIV infection discourage participation in HIV testing
and treatment programs.
AIDS-specific statutes that impose liability only for behavior medically
proven to transmit HIV and incorporate a defense of informed consent are
the preferred means of criminalizing the intentional transmission of HIV.
However, even the most narrowly drafted HIV criminal statute may prove
to be counter-productive in the fight against HIV infection. A statute that
requires defendants to know of their HIV infection at the time of the crimi-
nal act will discourage persons from determining their HIV status and enter-
ing education and treatment programs. The social and economic cost of this
strategy outweighs any benefit likely to result from prosecuting the few indi-
viduals who use the intentional tranmsission of HIV as a means of causing
serious injury or death to another person.
Stephen V Kenney
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